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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Arlyn Orr appeals from the judgment of conviction for resisting or obstructing an 
officer entered following a jury trial. On appeal, he asserts that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury's finding on the charge of resisting or obstructing an 
officer for his failure to participate in field sobriety tests upon request. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ar!yn Orr was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs, elevated to a felony by virtue of his having been convicted of 
felony DUI within the preceding fifteen years,1 and misdemeanor charges of possession 
of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle2 and resisting and obstructing 
officers. (R., pp.48-50.) The charge for resisting and obstructing officers reads as 
follows: 
The Defendant, ARL YN VAL ORR[], on or about March 11, 2011, in the 
County of Madison, State of Idaho, did willfully resist, delay or obstruct a 
public officer in the discharge, or attempted discharge, of a duty of his 
office, to wit: by disobeying and resisting a lawful order to exit his vehicle 
and/or other lawful requests or commands of Deputy Shawn Scott and/or 
Deputy Dallin Wrigley of the Madison County Sheriff's Office. 
(R., pp.67-68.) 
At trial, the State presented evidence that Deputy Scott, of the Madison County 
Sheriff's Office, while patrolling an isolated parking lot, noticed Mr. Orr asleep behind 
the wheel of a running car in which there were five open beer cans. It took Deputy Scott 
quite a while to awaken Mr. Orr, and it involved opening the door and shaking him. 
1 Mr. Orr was convicted of felony DUI. (R., pp.76-77.) That conviction is not at issue on 
appeal. 
1 
Before attempting to shake him awake, Deputy Scott turned off the vehicle's engine. 
(Tr., p.1 L.14 - p.145, L.3.) 
Mr. Orr eventually woke up. However, he continued to fall back asleep, and 
made several attempts to start the car. Deputy Scott spent about twenty minutes trying 
to get Mr. Orr to participate in field sobriety tests, but "[h)e didn't want to cooperate at 
all. He didn't want me there, he didn't want to talk to me. At some point, he eventually 
just started ignoring me." (Tr., p.146, L.2 - p.147, L.20.) Deputy Scott testified that if 
Mr. Orr had honored his request to get out of the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests 
"[i]t would have saved me a lot of time," and that his failure to cooperate delayed him in 
the performance of his duties. (Tr., p.149, Ls.9-15.) With respect to ignoring him, 
Deputy Scott explained, "he would not talk to me, not answer any of my questions. If he 
did say something, it was go away or leave me alone, I don't want you here, I'm not 
going to do that." (Tr., p.149, L.16 - p.150, L.2.) During the encounter, Deputy Scott 
said, Mr. Orr "repeatedly stated that I was in his vehicle, that I needed to leave, that his 
vehicle was similar to his house where I couldn't be there unless he wanted me there, 
things like that. I informed him, hey, no, I'm not going to leave, you need to comply with 
these things." (Tr., p.149, Ls.16-23.) 
Approximately twenty minutes into the encounter, Corporal Wrigley, also of the 
Madison County Sheriff's Office, arrived with a breath test machine. He described 
Mr. Orr as uncooperative for refusing to answer questions concerning the open beer 
cans. (Tr., p.210, Ls.2-11.) 
Mr. Orr testified that the reason he wouldn't get out of his vehicle that night was 
because "I didn't believe I had to. I believed I had rights." (Tr., p.340, Ls.18-20.) When 
2 Mr. Orr was acquitted of the open container charge. (Tr., p.437, Ls.11-13.) 
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asked about his lack of cooperation with Corporal Wrigley, he testified, "I think I had 
rights, too, then." (Tr., p.356, Ls.9-11.) When asked why he didn't just cooperate 
instead of getting pepper sprayed, he explained, "Not believing you have rights is the 
same as not having rights." (Tr., p.358, Ls.1-10.) Asked if he would do the same thing 
today, he responded that he "would have cited the same rights I believe I had." 
(Tr., p.358, L.22 - p.359, L.2.) 
During closing arguments, the State focused on Mr. Orr's refusal to participate in 
field sobriety tests as providing the basis for the resisting and obstructing charge, 
arguing that, although Mr. Orr could not be physically compelled to perform field 
sobriety tests, he had no constitutional right to refuse field sobriety tests, and therefore, 
no defense for his behavior. Specifically, the State argued, 
If he has a constitutional right to refuse to do what the officers wanted him 
to do then he couldn't be charged and couldn't be convicted of delaying 
and obstructing an officer. But if he has no right to refuse those things 
and he does refuse, if he does delay, he does obstruct, then he's guilty. 
(Tr., p.412, L.25 - p.413, L.13.) 
With respect to the administration of field sobriety tests, the jury was instructed, 
by stipulation of the parties, 
Under Idaho law a police officer - excuse me, a peace officer may request 
an individual to submit to a field sobriety test based on reasonable 
suspicion that the individual has been driving or was in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
other controlled substances. An individual does not have a constitutional 
right to refuse to cooperate with a lawfully requested field sobriety test 
even if he or she has the physical power to prevent or avoid the test. 
(Tr., p.391, L.25 - p.392, L.10.) 
Following deliberations, the jury found Mr. Orr guilty of, inter alia, resisting or 
obstructing an officer. (Tr., p.437, Ls.14-16.) Mr. Orr filed a Notice of Appeal timely 
from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.85.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Orr's conviction for resisting and obstructing 
a peace officer based on his refusal to perform field sobriety tests? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Orr's Conviction For Resisting And 
Obstructing An Officer Based On His Refusal To Perform Field Sobriety Tests 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Mr. Orr asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support his conviction for resisting and obstructing a peace officer for failing to perform 
field sobriety tests. The evidence was insufficient in two respects: (1) Mr. Orr could not 
be convicted of a crime for exercising a constitutional right, and (2) the State failed to 
present evidence that Mr. Orr knew that the officers' requests were lawful. 
B. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Orr's Conviction For Resisting 
And Obstructing An Officer Based On His Refusal To Perform Field Sobriety 
Tests 
Idaho Code § 18-705 provides: 
Every person who wilfully [sic] resists, delays or obstructs any public 
officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office 
or who knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer, when no other 
punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding one (1) year. 
I.C. § 18-705. 
1. Mr. Orr Could Not Be Convicted Of A Crime For Exercising A 
Constitutional Right 
It is well-established that the exercise of a constitutional right cannot serve as the 
basis for a criminal conviction. See Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City and County of San 
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) ("[A]ppellant had a constitutional right to insist that 
[housing] inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not 
constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection."); see also United 
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States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1353 (9th Cir. 1978) (improper to use a defendant's 
exercise of her Fourth Amendment right to refuse to consent to police entry into her 
home as evidence of her guilt). The administration of field sobriety tests constitutes a 
search. See State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 480-82 (Ct. App. 1999). Therefore, 
Mr. Orr's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests (a search) cannot form the basis for a 
criminal conviction for resisting or obstructing officers. 
To the extent that defense counsel's unfortunate stipulation to an incorrect jury 
instruction providing that no person operating a vehicle in this State has a constitutional 
right to refuse to perform field sobriety tests is relevant to this issue, Mr. Orr will 
establish why the instruction was legally wrong. First, unlike chemical testing of blood, 
breath, or urine, there is no statute providing that a person operating a vehicle in Idaho 
has impliedly consented to perform field sobriety tests. See I.C. § 18-8002 (statute 
providing for implied consent to submit to "evidentiary testing for concentration of 
alcohol as defined in section 18-8004,el Idaho Code ... [and] to evidentiary testing for 
the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances" upon request of a peace officer 
with reasonable grounds). Field sobriety tests do not fall under the implied consent 
statute. See State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 56 (Ct. App. 2008) (explaining, in a case 
involving field sobriety tests, "[t]he case before us involves no statutory implied consent" 
and that consent is not required to administer field sobriety tests). 
3 Idaho Code § 18-8004(4), in relevant part, provides that "an evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration shall be based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) 
cubic centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven (67) 
milliliters of urine." I.C. § 18-8004(4). It further provides that such analysis "shall be 
performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory 
approved by the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and certification 
standards to be set by that department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho 
state police." Id. 
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In Buell, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained that the physical ability to refuse to 
perform field sobriety tests "does not equate to a constitutional right to refuse" to 
perform those tests. Buell, 145 Idaho at 56. Mr. Orr asserts that the Court of Appeals' 
holding in Buell is incorrect because it rests on a misinterpretation of its own case law 
and a misapplication of Idaho and United States Supreme Court precedent. 
At issue in Buell was the defendant's claim that his consent to perform field 
sobriety tests was coerced when an officer, seeking his participation in field sobriety 
tests, told him, "You're required by law to do them," touched his back, and told him, 
"Let's do these, okay," at which point he performed the tests. Buell, 145 Idaho at 55. 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by discussing its decision in State v. Ferreira, 
133 Idaho 474 (Ct. App. 1999), in which it had "held that field sobriety tests, although 
searches, are a reasonable and permissible component of an investigation where the 
officer has detained the individual on reasonable suspicion of DUI." Id. at 56 (citing 
Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479-81). It then reasoned, "In light of our Ferreira decision, 
Buell's argument that his 'consent' to field sobriety tests was involuntary is simply 
immaterial for if, as Buell concedes, the officer reasonably suspected DUI, then the 
officer needed no consent from Buell in order to administer the tests," Id. It analogized 
field sobriety tests "to a warrantless pat-down search of an individual for weapons, 
conducted during an investigative detention." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1967)). 
The Court of Appeals then made the holding that provided the basis for the 
incorrect jury instruction in Mr. Orr's case, explaining, "It must be acknowledged, of 
course, that an individual who has been instructed by a police officer to perform field 
sobriety tests has the power to prevent the tests by refusing to cooperate, but that 
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power does not equate to a constitutional right to refuse." Buell, 145 Idaho at 56. In 
support of this contention, the Court of Appeals cited the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion 
in State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368 (1989). The Court of Appeals quoted from Woolery, 
which involved the taking of a blood sample from a driver injured in a car crash without 
obtaining his actual consent, as follows, '''Consent describes a legal act; 'refusal' 
describes a physical reality. By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a 
licensed driver to lawfully refuse, but it cannot remove his or her physical power to 
refuse." Id. (quoting Woolery, 116 Idaho at 372). 
While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that participation in field sobriety tests, 
unlike the blood test in Woolery, is not something to which a driver in Idaho has 
impliedly consented, it nonetheless found they "involve a separate exception to the 
warrant requirement established in Ferreira, which allows an officer to conduct field 
sobriety tests on reasonable suspicion." Id. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded, 
"Like the driver in Woolery, Buell had no right recognized in law to refuse the tests, and 
his mere retention of physical power to prevent the testing does not mean that his 
consent, in a legal sense, was necessary for lawful administration of the tests." Id. at 
56-57 (citing, inter alia, Alaska Court of Appeals dicta). 
The problems with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Buell are three-fold. First, it 
involves an unnecessarily broad reading of the Court of Appeals' holding in Ferreira that 
"both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 
of the Idaho Constitution require reasonable suspicion that a driver is in violation of 
I.C. § 18-8004 before field sobriety tests can be administered," by expanding an officer's 
lawful ability to administer sobriety tests upon only reasonable suspicion to include a 
requirement of participation. Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 484. Second, it equates the Idaho 
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Supreme Court's opinion in Woolery that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when 
blood is drawn from a driver without explicit consent because of the legal fiction that he 
has impliedly consented to such a blood draw by driving on the highways of this State, 
with a requirement that a person must waive his or her Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unlawful search by performing field sobriety tests on command. Third, it 
involves an unnecessary expansion of Terry to include a requirement that an individual 
disclose evidence that is otherwise concealed by engaging in physical tests on 
command. 
With respect to the unnecessary expansion of Terry, Mr. Orr begins by noting 
that the rule adopted in Terry was premised on the idea that the search approved of 
consisted only of what was "minimally necessary" and did not involve "a general 
exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he [the officer] might find." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The warrantless search that occurs via the administration of field 
sobriety tests is a search for evidence of a crime, the very evil that the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to prevent. 
Additionally, even if the Court of Appeals' conclusion in Buell is correct, it does 
not inexorably lead to the conclusion that failing to participate in the field sobriety tests 
is itself a violation of the resisting or obstructing statute. That statute appears to require 
more than a mere refusal to perform some requested action. See State v. Quimby, 122 
Idaho 389, 391 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding probable cause to arrest for obstructing when, 
although "Quimby did not touch the officers, he placed himself in the path of the officers, 
forcing them to push him out of the way . . . ignored the officers' repeated verbal 
requests to move away," and "placed himself unnecessarily close to the officers and 
made hand gestures in front of their faces"); State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 179 
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(Ct. App. 1988) (considering the statute and explaining that "passive disobedience has 
a legitimate role in testing the limits of" police authority) (citations omitted); State v. 
Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[i]t is well established that an individual 
may not use force to resist a peaceable arrest") (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, the fact that the legislature has specifically provided a non-criminal 
penalty for refusing to provide a breath sample during a DUI investigation implies that 
conduct such as is at issue here, refusing to provide evidence against oneself in a DUI 
prosecution, is not criminal conduct under any statute. See I.C. §§ 18-8002(3) 
(providing that, before being requested to submit to chemical testing, a driver must be 
informed that, inter alia, "[h]e is subject to a civil penalty of two hundred fifty dollars 
($250) for refusing to take the test") and 18-8002(4) (providing for imposition of such a 
penalty). Were it a crime to refuse a breath test, then the legislature would have 
included that provision in the information required to be provided prior to testing. 
2. The State Failed To Present Evidence That Mr. Orr Knew That The 
Officers' Requests Were Lawful 
Interpreting the resisting or obstructing statute, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
explained, 
Three elements must be satisfied in order to find a violation of the statute: 
"(1) the person who was resisted, delayed or obstructed was a law 
enforcement officer; (2) the defendant knew that the person was an 
officer; and (3) the defendant also knew at the time of the resistance that 
the officer was attempting to perform some official act or duty." 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Adams, 
138 Idaho 624, 629 (Ct. App. 2003». The Supreme Court also clarified that "[t]he term 
'duty' in section 18-705 includes only 'those lawful and authorized acts of a public 
officer." Id. at 817 (quoting State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174,180 (Cl. App. 1988». 
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By implication, then, to be guilty of resisting or obstructing an officer, the person 
must know that the officer was attempting to perform a lawful and authorized act. Here, 
the testimony was undisputed that Mr. Orr believed that Deputy Scott and Corporal 
Wrigley were violating his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure 
when they entered, and ordered him to get out of, his vehicle. (Tr., p.149, Ls.18-21 
(Deputy Scott testifying that Mr. Orr responded to his requests by "repeatedly stat[ing] 
that I was in his vehicle, that I needed to leave, that his vehicle was similar to his house 
where I couldn't be there unless he wanted me there, things like that."); p.340, Ls.18-20 
(Mr. Orr testifying that the reason he wouldn't get out of his vehicle was because "I 
didn't believe I had to. I believed I had rights."); p.356, LS.9-11 (when asked about his 
lack of cooperation with Corporal Wrigley, he testified, "I think I had rights, too, then."); 
p.358, Ls.1-10 (when asked why he chose to get pepper sprayed rather than cooperate, 
he testified, "Not believing you have rights is the same as not having rights."); p.358, 
L.22 - p.359, (when asked if he'd take the same action today, he responded that he 
"would have cited the same rights I believe I had").) As such, the State failed to present 
any evidence that Mr. Orr knew that the order to exit his vehicle was a lawful one.4 
4 By its plain language, the knowledge of a legal duty element, as articulated by the 




For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Orr respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction for resisting or obstructing an officer, and remand this 
matter for entry of a judgment of acquittal. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2013. 
R J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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